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VILLAGE OF BELLE TERRE v. BORAAS:
BELLE TERRE IS A NICE PLACE
TO VISIT-BUT ONLY
"FAMILIES" MAY LIVE THERE
The Village of Belle Terre, New York, passed a zoning ordinance
limiting occupancy of single-family dwellings to no more than two
unrelated persons.' This restriction did not apply to persons related
by blood, adoption or marriage, any number of whom could live in
one of Belle Terre's 220 homes. Plaintiff-homeowners leased their
Belle Terre house to six students attending a nearby state university.
During their tenancy, two of the students were denied resident beach
passes because they were violating the ordinance and thus were con-
sidered "illegal residents." When plaintiff-homeowners were served
with an "Order to Remedy Violations" of the ordinance, they joined
with three of their tenants and brought an action under 42 U.S.C. §
198 32 for injunctive relief against enforcement of the ordinance and
a declaratory judgment that the ordinance was unconstitutional. The
district judge denied a preliminary injunction and upheld the validity
of the ordinance. 3 He concluded that although the exclusionary
classification failed to promote such traditional zoning objectives as
safety, preservation of land from excessive use, or reduction of traffic
congestion, it nevertheless represented a lawful effort to maintain the
traditional family character of the community.4
I. BELLE TEURE, N.Y., BUILDING ZONE ORDINANCE art. 1, § D-1.35a (1970).
One or more persons related by blood, adoption or marriage, living and cook-
ing together as a single housekeeping unit [or a] number of persons but not
exceeding two (2) living and cooking together as a single housekeeping unit
though not related by blood, adoption or marriage shall be deemed to con-
stitute a family.
Id.
2. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1970). Under § 1983 plaintiffs must show two separate
elements: that defendant has deprived them of a right secured by the "Constitu-
tion and laws" of the United States; and that defendant has deprived them of
this right "under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage,
of any State or Territory." Adickes v. S.H. Kress & Co., 398 U.S. 144, 150 (1970).
3. Boraas v. Village of Belle Terre, 367 F. Supp. 136 (E.D.N.Y. 1972).
4. Id. at 146.
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The Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit reversed, holding
that the discriminatory classification created by the ordinance was
unsupported by any rational basis consistent with permissible zoning
objectives. Specifically, the court held that a zoning ordinance that
purports to protect prevailing consanguineous "family" patterns to
the exclusion of all others is beyond the proper exercise of the state's
police power.6 Municipalities "cannot under the mask of zoning
ordinances impose social preferences of this character upon their
fellow citizens."'
The court of appeals agreed with the trial court that the ordinance
did not promote traditional zoning objectives and furthermore held
that it would not hypothesize legitimate goals to rescue the legisla-
tion.8 The latter position is a departure from standard judicial analy-
sis of discriminatory legislation that does not involve fundamental
rights or suspect criteria.9 The court of appeals expressly refused to
consider whether the ordinance restricted plaintiffs' rights of privacy
or travel, for it believed itself to be "no longer limited to the either-or
choice between the compelling state interest test and the minimal
scrutiny . . . formula."' 0 The court believed that a new equal pro-
tection test was dictated by recent Supreme Court decisions"'-whether
5. Boraas v. Village of Belle Terre, 476 F.2d 806 (2d Cir. 1973); see Note, Up
the Down-Sliding Scale: Boraas v. Village of Belle Terre and Equal Protection
Assault on Restrictive Definitions of "Family' in Zoning Ordinances, 49 NOTRE
DAmE LAw. 428 (1973); 60 VA. L. Ryv. 154 (1974).
6. 476 F.2d at 815.
7. Id. at 816.
8. Id. at 815.
9. The Supreme Court has developed two equal protection analyses. Legislation
impairing a "fundamental right," Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618 (1969)
(travel); Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965) (marital privacy); Rey-
nolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533 (1964) (voting); NAACP v. Alabama ex rel. Patter-
son, 357 U.S. 449 (1958) (association), or predicated upon a "suspect" criterion,
Graham v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 365 (1971) (alienage); Loving v. Virginia, 388
U.S. 1 (1967) (race), is presumed unconstitutional and will be struck down unless
the state can demonstrate a compelling interest to justify the classification. This
more rigid standard for equal protection is known as the "strict scrutiny" test.
Other legislative determinations require a showing that the distinctions made are
rationally related to a legitimate state goal, and they "will not be set aside if any
state of facts reasonably may be conceived to justify" the legislation. This stand-
ard constitutes the "minimal scrutiny" test. McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S.
420, 426 (1961). See Tussman & tenBroek, The Equal Protection of the Laws,
37 CALIF. L. Rav. 341 (1949); Developments in the Law-Equal Protection, 82
HARv. L. Rav. 1065 (1969).
10. 476 F.2d at 814.
11. See Gunther, The Supreme Court, 1971 Term-Forward: In Search of
Evolving Doctrine on a Changing Court: A Model for a Newer Equal Protection,
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the legislative classification was in fact substantially related to the
ordinance's objective. 12 Because Belle Terre failed to show any factual
relation between the ordinance and legitimate zoning objectives, the
classification created by the ordinance was unjustified. The minimal
scrutiny equal protection test, which permits a court to hypothesize
legitimate goals to sustain the classification, was held inapplicable to
cases in which the rights allegedly denied cannot be classified as eco-
nomic, yet are not within the special class of rights deemed fundamen-
tal. The court viewed the right to live where and with whom one
pleases as an "important" right entitled to protection under the new
intermediate scrutiny formulation.-
In Village of Belle Terre v. Boraas'4 the Supreme Court reversed the
appellate court without discussing its equal protection approach.
The Court rejected appellees' claims that their fundamental rights of
travel, privacy and association had been violated by the ordinance,'15
and instead reviewed the classification using the minimal scrutiny
test. The ordinance was considered to be economic and social legisla-
tion entailing discretionary line drawing and was therefore immune
from judicial interference. Furthermore, Belle Terre's objective of
protecting its traditional family character was found to be within the
state's police power. This power, the Court stated, can be exercised to
"lay out zones where family values, youth values, and the blessings of
quiet seclusion, and clean air make the area a sanctuary for people."'16
Concern for the preservation and sanctity of the environment was ap-
parent in this justification of the ordinance: "A quiet place where
yards are wide, people few, and motor vehicles restricted are legitimate
guidelines in a land use project addressed to family needs."' 7
The Belle Terre decision will come as a bitter disappointment to
those who have opposed parochial land use regulation and the exclu-
sionary impact such regulation necessarily entails. The impact of Belle
86 HoRv. L. REv. 1 (1972); Note, Up the Down-Sliding Scale, supra note 5, at
432-33 & nn.35-42.
12. 476 F.2d at 814.
13. Id. at 813-14.
14. 94 S. Ct. 1536 (1974).
15. Six justices joined the majority opinion. Justice Brennan dissented on the
ground of mootness, maintaining that because the named tenants had moved out
the action was no longer a cognizable case or controversy. Justice Marshall wrote
the sole dissent on the merits.
16. Id. at 1541.
17. Id.
1974]
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Terre will extend beyond restrictive definitions of "family." The
sweeping permissiveness afforded to municipal land use control evi-
denced by this decision may in the future immunize zoning from in-
terference by the federal judiciary in all but the most blatantly un-
constitutional situations.1 8
In the landmark zoning decision, Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty
Co.,'1 the Supreme Court was confronted with a land use regulation
that diminished the value of plaintiff's property. Plaintiff therefore
presented a due process rather than an equal protection challenge.
The Court there sustained an ordinance that divided the municipality
into residential, commercial and industrial zones against plaintiff's
claim that a reduction in value of its property due to the classification
constituted a taking without due process. Legislation, the Court noted,
necessarily entails line drawing to the disadvantage of some, and "[i]f
the validity of the legislative classification for zoning purposes be fairly
debatable, the legislative judgment must be allowed to control." 20
With few exceptions, 21 Euclid's "hands-off" approach to municipal
zoning has been the standard Supreme Court approach.22 In Belle
Terre, however, the Court was confronted with a zoning ordinance
challenged on equal protection, not due process, grounds. Yet, the
Court relied upon Euclid as controlling precedent for its holding
that the Belle Terre ordinance did not deny equal protection.
The Belle Terre Court correctly viewed Euclid as sanctioning mu-
18. For example, racial discrimination in land use regulation has consistently
been held unconstitutional. See, e.g., Buchanan v. Warley, 245 U.S. 60 (1917);
Hawkins v. Town of Shaw, 437 F.2d 1286 (1971), aff'd in part, rev'd in part per
curiam, 461 F.2d 1171 (5th Cir. 1972) (en banc); Kennedy Park Homes Ass'n
v. City of Lackawanna, 436 F.2d 108 (2d Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 401 U.S. 1010
(1971); Dailey v. City of Lawton, 425 F.2d 1037 (10th Cir. 1970); Crow v.
Brown, 332 F. Supp. 382 (N.D. Ga. 1971), aff'd, 457 F.2d 788 (5th Cir. 1972);
Anderson v. Town of Forest Park, 239 F. Supp. 576 (W.D. Okla. 1965).
19. 272 U.S. 365 (1926).
20. Id. at 388; see 1 R. ANDERSON, AmERICAN LAW OF ZONING § 2.16 (1968).
21. See Washington ex rel. Seattle Titie Trust Co. v. Roberge, 278 U.S. 116
(1928); Nectow v. City of Cambridge, 277 U.S. 183 (1928).
22. It is most likely that had the Belle Terre case been brought on due process
grounds, it never would have reached the Supreme Court:
Had the owners alone brought this suit alleging that the restrictive ordinance
deprived them of their property or was an irrational legislative classification,
I would agree that the ordinance would have to be sustained. Our role is not
and should not be to sit as a zoning board of appeals.
94 S. Ct. at 1543 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
[Vol. 8:193
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nicipal exclusion of "harmful uses" (e.g., industry and apartments)23
from residential areas for the preservation of peace and quiet.
The Court concluded that the Belle Terre ordinance legitimately
excluded potentially harmful "urban problems" (i.e., greater density,
more traffic, and increased noise) 24 in order to preserve municipal
peace and quiet. The Village of Euclid, however, merely placed dif-
ferent uses of land into separate districts to insure, inter alia, munic-
pal tranquility. The Belle Terre ordinance, purportedly to achieve
similar results, adopted a classification-consanguinity-that is wholly
unrelated to land usage. The dissent recognized this distinction:
Zoning officials properly concern themselves with the uses of land
-with, for example, the number and kind of dwellings to be con-
structed in a certain neighborhood or the number of persons who
can reside in those dwellings. But zoning authorities cannot
validly consider who those persons are, what they believe, or how
they choose to live, whether they are Negro or white, Catholic
or Jew, Republican or Democrat, married or unmarried.25
Justice Douglas, writing for the majority, relied upon his opinion
in Berman v. Parker26 for the proposition that once an objective is
within the authority of a legislative body, the means employed to at-
tain that objective are for that body to determine.27 The "legitimate
goal" in Berman was the development of a better balanced and more
23. Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365, 394 (1926).
24. 94 S. Ct. at 1541.
25. Id. at 1544. In Women's Kansas City St. Andrew Soc'y v. Kansas City,
58 F.2d 593 (8th Cir. 1932), the court invalidated an ordinance that would have
excluded a home for elderly women from a residential district:
To justify such restriction the police power would have to be extended, not
only to restricting certain districts to residence purposes, but to restricting such
districts to particular classes of residents, and this has been quite universally
condemned ....
Id. at 603. See also Buchanan v. Warley, 245 U.S. 60 (1917); Village of Uni-
versity Heights v. Cleveland Jewish Orphans' Home, 20 F.2d 743 (6th Cir. 1927).
Courts have also invalidated ordinances limiting residential occupancy to elderly
citizens. Hinman v. Planning & Zoning Comm'n, 26 Conn. Supp. 125, 214 A.2d
131 (C.P. 1965). In Taxpayers Ass'n v. Weymouth Township, 125 N.J. Super.
376, 381, 311 A.2d 187, 189 (App. Div. 1973), the court concluded: "A munic-
pality may not regulate the age or makeup of the family unit permitted to reside
in the structure."
26. 348 U.S. 26 (1954).
27. Id. at 33.
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attractive community.28 Once this goal was adopted, the legislature
had the power to condemn non-slum property in accordance with a
comprehensive plan of urban renewal, even if it meant that the land
would ultimately be used for a private rather than a public purpose.20
"Subject to specific constitutional limitations, when the legislature
has spoken, the public interest has been declared in terms well-nigh
conclusive."30 This goal-oriented approach to municipal legislation
led the Court in Belle Terre to a summary disposition of the ordi-
nance's alleged constitutional violations.
Plaintiffs asserted that the ordinance restricted their constitutional
right to travel into the community since the uniform character of
Belle Terre provided no housing for three or more unrelated persons.
Their contention was summarily rejected on the ground that the ordi-
nance "is not aimed at transients."'3x The statement apparently im-
plies that an ordinance restricting or penalizing a transient's right to
travel is impermissible, while the same ordinance applied to a perma-
nent resident is valid. This approach is contrary to other Supreme
Court decisions concerned with the constitutional right to travel. In
Shapiro v. Thompson32 the Court held that a one-year residency re-
quirement for receipt of welfare benefits unduly inhibited migration
of indigents into the state and therefore was unconstitutional. The
Court focused on the "indigent who desires to migrate, resettle, find a
new job, and start a new life"33 in the community, thus indicating that
permanence, not transiency, elicits the constitutionally protected right
to travel.34 In Dunn v. Blumsteinss the Court invalidated a Tennessee
statute requiring state residency for one year as a condition precedent
to voter registration. Again the Court emphasized the permanence of
plaintiff's residency as a determinative factor in protecting his right to
travel.36
28. Berman is an eminent domain case that involved governmental acquisition
of private property for a public purpose. Belle Terre is a police power regulation
case. For a discussion of the distinction between these two areas see D. HRAMAN,
URBAN PLANNING AND LAND DEVELOPMENT CONTROL LAW § 180 (1971).
29. 348 U.S. at 33.
30. Id. at 32.
31. 94 S. Ct. at 1540.
32. 394 U.S. 618 (1969).
33. Id. at 629.
34. See Brief for Appellees at 17-18 & n.15, Village of Belle Terre v. Boraas,
94 S. Ct. 1536 (1974) [hereinafter cited as Brief for Appellees].
35. 405 U.S. 330 (1972).
36. Id. at 334 & n.4.
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In both Shapiro and Dunn the right to travel was curtailed by the
denial of a constitutional or demonstrably important right37 during
the early stages of residency, and the Court invalidated such a denial.
The Belle Terre ordinance in fact renders the right to travel an exer-
cise in futility: three unrelated persons may travel to the village, yet
they can be prohibited from residing together therein.38 This result
merited a more detailed judicial analysis. The Court's failure to
elaborate its reasons for denial of the right to travel claim will be of no
assistance to courts that are subsequently faced with parochial land use
regulations. Somewhat encouraging is a recent district court decision39
holding Belle Terre inapplicable to a municipal growth control plan.
The court held that such a plan violates an outsider's right to travel
into the community.
Plaintiffs also asserted that because the ordinance only regulates
occupancy of homes in which unrelated persons live, it reached be-
yond land use or density control and undertook to regulate the way
people choose to associate with each other in the privacy of their
own homes.40 The Supreme Court has stressed repeatedly that per-
sonal privacy within the confines of one's own home is closely guarded
from state interference4 1 Plaintiffs argued that the intimate social,
cultural and intellectual interaction present in their living arrange-
ments was analogous to any traditional family relation and was there-
37. Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U.S. 471 (1970), determined that welfare is
not a fundamental constitutional right. In light of Dandridge, Shapiro v. Thomp-
son, 394 U.S. 618 (1969), can be read as holding that the right to travel was the
central issue and not that welfare rights per se were fundamental. Arguably then,
any set of facts that present a right to travel question should have that issue dealt
with independently and as involving a fundamental right.
38. One commentator labels this hardship a "minimal sacrifice" and equates
its imposition on plaintiffs with the levy of a service charge or fee on commercial
airline passengers that was sustained in Evansv.ille-Vanderburgh Airport Authority
v. Delta Airlines, Inc., 405 U.S. 707 (1972). 60 VA. L. REv. 163, 173-74 (1974).
39. Construction Indus. Ass'n v. City of Petaluma, 375 F. Supp. 574, 584 &
n.1 (1974). Petaluma, in accordance with lower federal court opinions, did not
distinguish between interstate and intrastate travel. King v. New Rochelle
Municipal Housing Authority, 442 F.2d 646 (2d Cir. 1971); Cole v. Housing
Authority, 435 F.2d 807 (1st Cir. 1970). Although the issue was before
the Supreme Court in Belle Terre, Brief for Appellees 19-20, the Court failed
to consider whether intrastate travel, in addition to interstate travel, was a con-
stitutionally protected fundamental right.
40. Brief for Appellees 22.
41. See, e.g., Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973); Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S.
438 (1972); Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965); Note, On Privacy:
Constitutional Protection for Personal Liberty, 48 N.Y.U.L. Rtv. 670 (1973).
19741
Washington University Open Scholarship
URBAN LAW ANNUAL
fore entitled to equivalent protection. 42 Furthermore, plaintiffs, as
graduate sociology students, urged that their living arrangement con-
stituted a "useful forum for scholarly exchange" 43 and as such was
entitled to constitutional protection within the purview of the first
amendment.
The Court rejected the right of privacy argument and held that
plaintiffs' freedom of association was not infringed since under the
ordinance they could "entertain whomever they like.' '44 This narrow
reading of the right of association conflicts with United States Depart-
ment of Agriculture v. Moreno45 and most notably with Justice Doug-
las' concurrence in that decision. In Moreno the Court invalidated
an amendment to the Food Stamp Act46 that rendered any household
containing unrelated members ineligible for food stamps. The Court
rejected the Government's contentions that unrelated households are
more likely to abuse the program and that, because of their "relative
instability," such abuse would go undetected.47 Concurring in Moreno,
Justice Douglas noted that the banding together of the poor to better
meet the adversities of poverty constitutes an expression of the free-
dom of association ingrained in the American tradition.4 "The right
of association, the right to invite the stranger into one's home is too
basic in our constitutional regime to deal with roughshod."40 "Invite"
in the Moreno context did not mean "entertain!"0 but rather to accept
an unrelated person into the household as a part of the "family"
unit.51 Justice Douglas also stated that the right of association in
42. Brief for Appellees 25-26
43. Id. at 25 n.20.
44. 94 S. Ct. at 1541.
45. 413 U.S. 528 (1973).
46. 7 U.S.C. § 2012(e) (Supp. II, 1972), amending 7 U.S.C. § 2012(c)
(1970).
47. But even if we were to accept as rational the Government's wholly un-
substantiated assumptions concerning the differences between "related" and
"unrelated" households, we still could not agree with the Government's con-
clusion that the denial of essential federal food assistance to all otherwise
eligible households containing unrelated members constitutes a rational effort
to deal with these concerns.
413 U.S. at 535-36. See Tussman & tenBroek, supra note 9, at 344-53.
48. 413 U.S. at 514 (Douglas, J., concurring).
49. Id. at 543.
50. Cf. text at note 44 supra.
51. As the facts of [Moreno] show, the poor are congregating in households
where they can better meet the adversities of poverty. This banding together
[Vol. 8:193
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Moreno was a fundamental right entitled to protection absent a show-
ing of a compelling state interest.52 Arguably, Justice Douglas' views
on the right of association, as expressed in Moreno5 3 if applied to
Belle Terre, would lead him to invalidate the ordinance. Contrary
to his position in Moreno, however, he adopted in Belle Terre a nar-
row interpretation of the first amendment right of association. 54
Given Justice Douglas' express reasons for concurring in Moreno,55
perhaps he would have viewed Belle Terre differently had plaintiffs
been two widows with several dependent children who were banding
together to make ends meet56 instead of six college students living in a
"communal" arrangement.5 7
Belle Terre presented an opportunity for the Supreme Court to de-
cide two important and pressing legal issues. The ordinance was in-
validated by the court of appeals on the basis of the novel equal pro-
tection doctrine of "factual rationality." This doctrine provides a
middle ground that attempts to ameliorate the rigidities of the mini-
mal and strict scrutiny tests. "Two-tiered" equal protection satis-
factorily protects rights that the Court has deemed fundamental. A
state has yet to demonstrate a sufficiently compelling interest to permit
the impairment of a fundamental right.58 The narrow delimitation
is an expression of the right of freedom of association that is very deep in
our traditions.
: .* Taking a person into one's home because he is poor or needs help orbrings happiness to the household is of the same dignity [as other first amend-
ment rights].
413 U.S. at 541-42 (Douglas, J., concurring) (emphasis added). Accord, 94
S. Ct. 1545 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
52. 413 U.S. at 543-45 (Douglas, J., concurring). See also note 9 supra.
53. See 413 U.S. at 541-45 (Douglas, J., concurring).
54. 94 S. Ct. at 1541; cf. 413 U.S. at 541-45 (Douglas, 3., concurring).
55. See note 51 supra.
56. In People v. Skidmore, 69 Misc. 2d 320, 329 N.Y.S.2d 881 (J.P. Ct. 1971),
two husbandless women, in violation of a municipal ordinance narrowly defining
"family" as no more than five unrelated persons, pooled their money and, with
their seven children, rented a home. The court dismissed the complaint reasoning
that "these are merely two individuals who have for economic or other reasonsjoined forces in occupying a one.family dwelling as a family unit." Id. at 322,
329 N.Y.S.2d at 883. But see City of Newark v. Johnson, 70 N.J. Super. 381, 175
A.2d 500 (L. Div. 1961).
57. It was conceded by all that plaintiffs had always behaved in a responsible
manner, and no immoral or disorderly conduct on their part was ever suggested.
Brief for Appellees 3.
58. But cf. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
Washington University Open Scholarship
URBAN LAW ANNUAL
of fundamental rights,59 however, has left a host of essential personal
rights unprotected, including the right to welfare,00 housing61 edu-
cation62 and now, choice of life-style. Theoretically these rights are
protected, for the state must show that a classification impairing them
bears a rational relation to a legitimate state objective. Yet minimal
scrutiny allows the court to exercise its imagination to save legisla-
tion that the state has failed to justify adequately.AC The minimal
scrutiny test applies whenever "economic and social legislation" is in-
volved.64 The real problem is presented by the radically divergent
interests that are catalogued together under the classification "eco-
nomic and social." Commercial advertisingGs differs significantly from
the need of an indigent family to receive welfare benefits, 0 yet under
standard equal protection analysis both are treated alike. The factual
rationality test proposed by the Second Circuit would treat the more
important of the non-fundamental rights, including choice of life-style,
with a greater degree of concern. Discriminating against these rights
would not trigger the extremely difficult requirement of demonstrat-
ing a compelling state interest. On the other hand, neither would
the courts be allowed to indulge in abdicatory judicial hypothesis.
The factual rationality test would simply require that the legislative
body show that its classification actually relates to a legitimate pur-
pose. Applying this test to the Belle Terre ordinance, however, would
not have changed the result reached by the Supreme Court. Although
traditional zoning objectives were not available that would "factually
justify" this ordinance,67 the Court's holding that social homogeneity
was a legitimate municipal goal would have been sufficient to sustain
the classification.
The decision that social homogeneity constitutes a legitimate zon-
ing goal is arguably the first exposition of the Supreme Court's
59. See note 9 supra.
60. Jefferson v. Hackney, 406 U.S. 535 (1972); Richardson v. Belcher, 404 U.S.
78 (1971); Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U.S. 471 (1970).
61. Lindsey v. Normet, 405 U.S. 56 (1972).
62. San Antonio Independent School Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1 (1972).
63. See text at notes 10-13 supra.
64. E.g., Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U.S. 471 (1970); Gunther, supra note 11,
at 23; Developments in the Law, supra note 9, at 1080-81.
65. Railway Express Agency, Inc. v. New York, 336 U.S. 106 (1949).
66. Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U.S. 471 (1970).
67. See text at note 4 supra.
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position on exclusionary land use regulation. Exclusionary zoning
has become a topic of great concern in recent years, and commentators
are in near-unanimous agreement that the practice is unconstitu-
tional.6s Such zoning is aimed at excluding persons who differ from
those presently residing in a particular community. The exclusionary
aim is manifested by that community's prohibition of apartments,69
or by adoption of large-lot zoning,70 or, as in Belle Terre, by re-
strictive definitions of "family."71 Municipal motivation for ex-
clusionary practices may be economic,7 2 racial73 or psychological.74
These practices endure and increase primarily because such motivat-
68. See, e.g., Aloi & Goldberg, Racial and Economic Exclusionary Zoning: The
Beginning of the End?, 1971 URBAN L. ANN. 9; Sager, Tight Little Islands: Ex-
clusionary Zoning, Equal Protection, and the Indigent, 21 STAN. L. REv. 767
(1969); Williams & Norman, Exclusionary Land Use Controls: The Case of
North-Eastern New Jersey, 22 SYRACUSE L. Rnv. 475 (1971); Note, Exclusionary
Zoning and Equal Protection, 84 HArv. L. REv. 1645 (1971); Note, Snob Zon-
ing: Must a Man's Home Be a Castle?, 69 MIICH. L. REV. 339 (1970); Note,
The Constitutionality of Local Zoning, 79 YALE L.J. 896 (1970). For detailed
discussions of the specific problem in Belle Terre see Note, "Burning the House
to Roast the Pig": Unrelated Individuals and Single Family Zoning's Blood Re-
lation Criterion, 58 CORNELL L. REV. 138 (1972); Comment, All in the "Family":
Legal Problems of Communes, 7 HARv. Cmv. RIGHTS-CrY. Lm. L. Rxv. 393
(1972); Note, Excluding the Commune From Suburbia: The Use of Zoning for
Social Control, 23 HASTINGS L.J. 1459 (1972).
69. E.g., Fanale v. Borough of Hasbrouck Heights, 26 N.J. 320, 139 A.2d 749
(1958).
70. E.g., County Comm'rs v. Miles, 246 Md. 355, 228 A.2d 450 (1967).
71. E.g., Palo Alto Tenants' Union v. Morgan, 487 F.2d 883 (9th Cir. 1973).
Compare Comment, The Constitutional Implications of a Restrictive Definition of
Family in Zoning Ordinances, 17 S.D.L. REv. 203 (1972), with 1973 URBAN L.
ANN. 319.
72. An influx of low- and middle-income persons into a community may require
an increased need for capital expenditure. E.g., Construction Indus. Ass'n v. City
of Petaluma, 375 F. Supp. 574 (1974). A recent study concludes that such fiscal
incentives for exclusion are negligible. Branfman, Cohen & Trubek, Measuring
the Invisible WVall: Land Use Controls and the Residential Patterns of the Poor,
82 YALE L.J. 483, 501-02 (1973).
73. E.g., Dailey v. City of Lawton, 425 F.2d 1037 (10th Cir. 1970); see Aloi
& Goldberg, supra note 63, at 11.
74. The major goals of planning and zoning for residential areas are widely
recognized. The most important [is] ... protection against "psychological
nuisances," based on irrational dislikes-fear of the unknown, or dislike of
"the wrong sort of people."
N. WILLIAMS, THE STRUCTURE OF URBAN ZoNiNg 62 (1966).
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ing factors remain the "hidden agenda" never openly discussed by
municipalities when justifying an ordinance. Such considerations
remain covert, while population density, traffic control, and noise
control provide the express justifications and suffice to uphold
the ordinance given "Euclidian"'' 5 judicial deference. In Belle Terre,
however, these rationalizations were unnecessary. The Court's con-
dusion that maintaining the traditional family character of Belle.
Terre is a legitimate zoning objective eliminates the need for second-
ary justifications. In fact, the reason for this conclusion-that the
municipality can "lay out zones where family values [and] youth
values" will flourish 76-was not responsive to the situation facing the
Court. Belle Terre's ordinance created no zone for "youth values."
Clearly no zone was created for values that inhere in groups of three
or more unrelated persons. The entire community was zoned as a
"quiet place." Therefore, the Court sanctioned not a division of the
community on grounds of use compatibility, but rather a complete ex-
clusion of unrelated persons from Belle Terre based upon parochial
municipal perceptions. 77
Belle Terre read narrowly determines that a restrictive definition of
"family" is permissible for the maintenance of the traditional char-
acter of the community. Belle Terre read broadly stands for the
proposition that a municipality can exercise its zoning power to ex-
clude "incompatible people" as well as incompatible uses. Under
Belle Terre certain people can be excluded for the purpose of making
the community "a quiet place," with "the blessings of quiet seclusion"
as the ultimate goal. "While such selective exclusion may be practiced
75. See text at notes 19-22 supra.
76. 94 S. Ct. at 1541.
77. Zoning, important as it is within limits, is too rapidly becoming a
legalized device to prevent property owners from doing whatever their neigh-
bors dislike. Protection of minority rights is as essential to democracy as
majority vote. In our age of conformity it is still not possible for all to be
exactly alike, nor is it the instinct of our law to compel uniformity wherever
diversity may offend the sensibilities of those who cast the largest numbers of
votes in municipal elections. The right to be different has its place in this
country.
People v. Stover, 12 N.Y.2d 462, 472, 191 N.E.2d 272, 278, 240 N.Y.S.2d 734,
........ (1963) (Van Voorhis, J., dissenting).
Should local units be granted the power to exclude individuals they do not
want", however, individuals would be unable to choose to join communities
which most satisfy their own lifestyle preferences. The promise of diversity
would become a straitjacket of local conformity, with change precluded by
one group's exclusion of all others.
Note, The Constitutionality of Local Zoning, supra note 68, at 902.
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by private institutions, it cannot be tolerated on the part of a govern-
mental body such as Belle Terre, which is bound to serve the pub-
lic."71s
Belle Terre could effectively discourage zoning litigation in federal
courts except in instances of obvious racial discrimination.79 While
the decision does not preclude litigation in state courts, and indeed,
similar ordinances have been invalidated under state constitutions, 0
it does constitute a pronouncement by the United States Supreme
Court that municipal parochialism will be judicially tolerated. Build-
ing upon Eudid's physical division of uses within the community,
Belle Terre has sanctioned the use of municipal zoning as a tool of
social control.
Robert J. Hartman
78. Boraas v. Village of Belle Terre, 476 F.2d 806, 816 (2d Cir. 1973).
79. See note 18 and accompanying text supra.
80. See City of Des Plaines v. Trottner, 34 Ill. 2d 432, 216 N.E.2d 116 (1966);
Kirsch Holding Co. v. Borough of Manasquan, 59 N.J. 241, 281 A.2d 513 (1971).
In Gabe Collins Realty, Inc. v. City of Margate City, 112 N.J. Super. 341, 349,
271 A.2d 430, 434 (App. Div. 1970), the court reasoned:
Dwelling units of a size adequate to accommodate a normal family are rea-
sonably susceptible of occupancy by more than two unrelated persons with-
out such accompanying threat to the public welfare, in any of its many
aspects ... as warrants a restriction of occupancy to so few a number.
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